Georgia Archive
Volume 4 | Number 1

Article 3

January 1976

On Booknapping and Other Headaches
Alfredda Scobey
Georgia Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/georgia_archive
Part of the Archival Science Commons
Recommended Citation
Scobey, Alfredda, "On Booknapping and Other Headaches," Georgia Archive 4 no. 1 (1976) .
Available at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/georgia_archive/vol4/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia
Archive by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@kennesaw.edu.

Scobey: On Booknapping and Other Headaches
ON BOOKNAPPING AND OTHER HEADACHES

Alfredda Scobey

you remember the lovely old book.mark with the legend:
Steal not this book for fear of shame,
For it is in the owner's name
And when you're dead the Lord will say
Where is that book you stole away?
It seems that in today's world, we have to rely less
on the suspect's fear of questioning by the Lord and more on
the inculcation of a proper respect for questioning by our
law enforcement people and--let's face it--by ourselves. The
sad truth. is that if we do not do it ourselves, it will not
be done. The sage was right who said: "An alert and dedicated staff is the most effective defense a library can have."
You have asked me to come here with some suggestions
on detection and deterrence. This puts me, as we say, between a rock and a hard place. You all know about physical
security of archives and libraries than I do, as Mr. Berkeley's
magnificent presentation well proves. Yet if I confine myself
to talking about law, I wil l be like the child who, when his
father asked what the teacher had said, replied, ''More than I
wanted to know."
After weighing these hazards, I have decided to talk
about archives and library security in terms of circumstantial evidence. This type of evidence takes up considerable
time and thought on the part of lawyers. One of our early
great judges, Justice Bleckley, pointed out that often among
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the facts most clearly established in a case are those to
which no witness had ever testified.
I will give you an example of circumstantial evidence. A rather scroungy little man walked into Tiffany's
in New York some years back and asked to look at diamond
rings. The clerk took a tray of rings out of the showcase
and laid it on top of the glass counter. After examining
them carefully, the customer asked to see something better.
The clerk replaced the tray and got out another one. That
in turn was rejected and replaced. Eventually the clerk
brought out a tray from the interior of a vault with each
exquisite ring sparkling in its _own_place. After the customer had examined them all under the eagle eye of the staff,
he turned to leave without making a purchase. As he reached
the door, he stumbled and fell, and out of his pockets rolled
two- or three-dozen glittering cut stones. You can imagine
what happened: somebody locked the door, somebody called
the police, and three or four stout men held the suspect
down. Unfortunately, the brilliants were from Woolworths,
and were poor quality at that. And the purported customer
turned out to be none other than Groucho Marx, who had pulled
the hoax in order to win a bet.
Did Groucho Marx have a false arrest suit against
anybody? Certainly everybody in that store had what the
lawbooks call "probable cause" to think him a thief, which
is really what I am here to talk to you about. Probable
cause, in the context of theft, is simply that totality of
circumstances which would make a reasonable man believe that
a particular human being has possessed himself of a particular piece of property belonging to somebody else, and that
his purpose in doing so is to make off with it without the
owner's consent. Now, all sorts of things can lead you to
such a conclusion, from a wild hunch to actually seeing the
person stick the item under his coat, and the question you
always have to ask yourself when you reach this conclusion
is whether that fictional masterpiece and darling of the
law~the hypothetical man of ordinary prudence and discretion--would reach the same conclusion you have. If he would,
or if a jury would think he would under the circumstances,
then you have probable cause. Otherwise you do not. Simple,
isn't it?
The fact of the matter is, however, that if custodians of books and records and artifacts err, it is usually
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on the side of conservatism. I have never heard of a false
arrest action being brought against a librarian, and am sure
that none has been in Georgia. The Archivist of the United
States has pointed out that archivists are a trained and ded·
icated group with a strong public service orientation. He
adds:
I wonder if we are sometimes prone to forget
that not all those with whom we come in contact
have equally high standards of probity and honesty
• . • • [We need to] devote at least a little time
to the fact that documents are sometimes stolen, to
the ways in which thieves operate, and to a study
of deterrents against theft. We must teach our
archivists to be suspicious and watchful without
diminishing in any respect their obligation to be
courteous and helpful to researchers.!
It seems to me that this is putting a great burden
on you to be two kinds of people at the same time, as though
you were expected to be both a doctor and a detective. But
it is true that even with police officers and security men
around, it is ultimately the staff who prevents or detects
documentary theft.
There is such a thing as a professional thief of
valuable documents. It is your job to educate him into the
realization that there are other avenues of trade more remunerative for him, and that he has made a tragic error in
his choice of career. To do this you must on occasion be
alert and willing to act on the evidence before you.
What is required in the way of surveillance depends
less on the class of people using the facilities than on the
value of the holdings. Even sedate and elegant institutions
patronized in the main by serious researchers become vulnerable as they accumulate rare items which attract the
attention of a professional documents or museum thief, or
the value of which proves tempting to someone who heretofore
has proved to be a trustworthy employee. I might say that
my reading in the area suggests that in a truly great percentage of the important heists an ·employee is implicated,
either acting alone or working in concert with a professional specialist in this type of theft. This is outside
the purpose of my discussion today, except to point out
that it exists and that the security measures to combat it
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are of a different and specialized character.
In document theft, the same circumstances operate
as in shoplifting. I recently heard a talk by the head of
security at Rich's department store, who said that not only
is inventory loss by theft now accelerating astronomically,
so that it equals between 1 and 2 percent of sales, but
samplings of recovered goods suggest that a majority were
stolen by or in connivance with an employee working in the
store. This is a horrifying state of affairs, but it is one
of the facts of life in today's business world. Nevertheless, stores are frequent targets of false arrest suits, which
may be even more costly. Therefore, the motto of these security people, and I also advise it for those on your staffs
stationed in reading rooms, is ''IF YOU DIDN'T SEE I T, IT

DIDN'T HAPPEN."
Institutions such as the Atlanta Public Library
sustain their losses primarily piecemeal and as a result
of customer theft. This means that the usual theft will
not reach felony proportions. In Georgia there are no such
things as common law crimes. Only what is declared illegal
by statute can be the subject of police action. The statute
determines whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor,
because he.r e by definition any crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for over one year is a felony. All
other offenses are misdemeanors. The maximum penalty for a
misdemeanor is a year in jail and a $1,000 fine. A theft
of goods, the value of which totals less than $100, is declared to be a misdemeanor; over $100, it is a felony.
This has important consequences. A citizen's arrest can
be made only when the person actually sees the crime being
committed in his presence, unless the crime is a felony and
the perpetrator is escaping and the person has probable cause
to believe this man actually committed the crime.
You may be surprised to learn that, so far as I can
find out, no actual arrests are made by the Atlanta Public
Library, although it employs a detective and a security
officer and also makes use of Checkpoint, one of the better
electronic surveillance meth0ds. All books are electrically
coded, and there is a very efficient turnstyle system that
forces traffic to flow out through a narrow passage where
books are checked out by deactivating an electronic signal
which has been placed in them. If the signal is not deactivated, the turnstyle locks and the customer is unable
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to exit. At that point, the customer is politely reminded
by the attendant at the desk that he should produce his book
to be checked, or he is asked to open his briefcase, or whatever, to determine the cause for the alarm. If the customer
refuses point blank, however, the staff employee at the desk
must release the turnstyle lock and allow his departure. In
the end, the system has only a psychological value. And it is
expensive. I do not know what Atlanta pays, but such a system normally costs $2,500 or more per year for rental, plus
15¢ to 30¢ per book for the tape, plus a tremendous amount
of staff time to place the coded material in each book.
Furthermore, it is far from accurate. The system picks up
any metal, and a metal briefcase, or a can of hair spray in
a pocketbook, will set it off. Also it can be fooled. If
the book is carried under one's pants belt with a coat over
it, or under one's coat with an arm over it, there will be
no signal. In spite of all this, the Atlanta Library feels
the system worthwhile, which gives some indication of the
volume of book thefts. When a large system like the Atlanta
Library simply throws up its hands insofar as invoking the
law, it becomes clear what every depository of books and
papers is up against. After making some study of the laws
on the books, I have become convinced that we do in fact need
legislation which will allow archivists and librarians some
practical access to the law as a deterrent to theft.
First, let me point out that there are separate
categories of thieves and that it would be rewarding to consider briefly the kind of people you may come up against. At
one end of the spectrum is t he absent minded professor who
unintentionally gets a manuscript mixed up with his own papers and starts out with it . There is the busy researcher
who is technically guilty. He has to leave and decides it
would be much easier for him to finish his reading in the
privacy of his own home before sneaking the copy back in.
There is the very occasional scholar who has become so enamored of his own field, and developed such a sentimental
attachment to his area, that the temptation of personally
possessing some document or artifact is irresistible. There
i s the true pathological kleptomaniac. There is the amateur
beset by sudden temptation, and there is the professional who
works through a fence or even sometimes on colll11lission from
an unscrupulous dealer or collector. He is, of course, the
most dangerous, and you are not likely to catch him in the
act. He will have given false references, if you demand
references, and one of the best safeguards you can have is
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to make at least spotchecks to be absolutely certain that
users unknown to you personally have the proper credentials.
If the price is worth it, he may go to great lengths to
establish himself as a bona fide scholar. There are also,
as recent events have shown, both the mentally unstable and
the political protester, such as the group of women revolutionaries who bombed the Harvard Library in 1970. There
also have been instances of destruction of catalogues .
Facing these hazards and a stunning increase in possessory crimes in the past few years, archivists confront
two questions. One is how best to keep people, either inadvertently or with intent, from removing property without
consent from repositories. The other is how far it is
prudent to go in ambiguous circumstances without subjecting
yourselves or your employer to charges of false arrest or
false imprisonment. There are, in the present state of the
law, stringent safeguards which a suspect may invoke, and I
believe it might be helpful to go into the reasons for them
so that you can better understand the issues as they are
sometimes seen by trial judges. This also will give my
reasons for certain changes I would recommend in the law.
In general, a suspect's defenses are constitutional
in nature, usually predicated on the Fourth amendment in
the Bill of Rights, enacted in 1791 and described as one
of the most litigated provisions in the Constitution. It
provides that every man shall be safe in his person, papers
and effects, and that no search is legal except on oath
specially designating the person or place to be searched
and on a showing of probable cause. The Supreme Court recently stated that probable cause (to believe a crime has
been committed) is not a technical concept, but is based on
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men act (Adams, 407 U.S.). It
applies to arrests, detentions, and searches. Searches without search warrants are always illegal, except in certain
instances or by virtue of certain legislation which I will
mention shortly. Somebody who knows sufficient facts to
constitute probable cause must swear to those facts before
a judge or magistrate, and if the magistrate agrees, he may
issue a warrant. This warrant is served only by a peace
officer and only on the person or the property which it describes. That forbids you from making any search ever of
a person you think is concealing stolen goods on his person, or among his effects, unless you come under an exception.
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Not only that, it eliminates your calling any policeman to
search the suspect under any circumstances, unless you are
very sure you can prove the value of the object is over $100.
Remember that a policeman cannot arrest and search without
a warrant if the theft is a misdemeanor, rather than a felony,
unless he personally has seen the of fender take the item.
What you tell him may amount to probable cause to believe
the suspect is in possession of the material, but the officer
can arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant only if the
misdemeanor is cotmnitted in his presence. Hence, in Georgia
the idea of holding a suspect by watching or talking to him
until you can get a policeman may not necessarily work, even
if the officer arrives immediately and even if he believes
you, unless you convince him also that the value of the
material reaches felony proportions. This explains why the
Atlanta Public Library makes no arrests.
Lest .w arrants appear more impediment than support
of law, they are in fact absolutely vital to our existence
as a free people. It has been recognized since the days of
the Magna· Carta that the power of government to take a citizen's
person or property, unless it was lawfully undertaken and unless a written record showed it to be lawful, was slavery.
By the eighteenth century this was well established; however,
another practice had grown up of issuing what were called
"general warrants." While they showed that a crime had been
cotmnitted, and authorized a search, they did not specify who
could do the searching or who could be searched. Henc~,
anybody could use them on anybody. General warrants became
the same as no warrant at all. This went on until 1763 when
the British Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, felt it necessary
to suppress an underground periodical called the North Briton.
He issued som~ of these warrants, and among the houses searched
on the strength of them was that of a member of Parliament,
John Wilkes. Nothing was found. Wilkes brought a damage suit
against Lord Halifax based on the proposition that general
warrants were void and that Halifax was no better than a
criminal in having his, Wilkes', house ransacked under these
circumstances. Amazingly, Wilkes won the case, and a jury
gave him61,000, or about $24,000 in today's money. He then
brought suit for false imprisonment based on the same transaction and was awarded close to $100,000. American history
buffs will remember the incendiary effect this had on Americans complaining of some similar British practices in the
colonies.
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With your permission I will skip the next 200 years
and get to the present state of repair of the edifice raised
on those ancient and honorable foundations. Since World War
II, expanding social consciousness on the one hand and in
creased problems resulting from criminal activity on the
other have given rise not so much to changes in the structure
of the law as to a complicated architecture of U.S. Supreme
Court opinions attempti ng to delimit the rights and duties
of peace officers. The affects directly concern archivists
in institutions large enough to have security guards or
detectives equipped with police powers on call, and knowledge
of the opinions is a prelude to an understanding of the rights
and responsibilities of every archivist and librarian.
In 1968, just 200 years after the British Wilkes
case, the U. S. Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S.
1). A plainclothesman in Cleveland, Ohio, had .noticed three
men acting strangely. He watched them for a lengthy period.
One man would walk down the street, look in a store window,
move away, look in again, and then go back and talk to the
other two. A second man would repeat the performance, and
so on. The officer decided the men were casing the store
preparatory to a hold up. Note that he had no "probable
cause" for this conclusion, but he did have an "informed
suspicion." He went up to them to investigate. Their
answers were unsatisfactory; he quickly "frisked" one of
them, Terry, by patting his outer clothing, felt a hard object, reached in and drew out a revolver. He was then in a
position to arrest Terry for carrying a concealed weapon-that is, for a misdemeanor being conunitted in his presence.
One of the predicates of a lawful arrest is that the suspect
may then be fully searched, as well as taken down to the
stati on house, booked, and interrogated at length. Terry
eventually was convicted o f possession of a concealed weapon
and contended that the conviction should be set aside because
he had been unlawfully arrested and searched. This led the
court to face the hard realities of life, and to acknowledge
that a "stop" is a sort of seizure, and a "frisk" is a sort
of search. But it reached the conclusion that "stop and
frisk," within limits, could be performed on less probable
cause than "search and seizure." The ultimate conclusion of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio was that when a pol ice officer (and please note here that I am still talking
about policemen and not ordinary citizens like you and me)
"observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity
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may be afoot," and while these facts do not amount to probable cause to believe a felony is being committed in his
presence, they yet serve as a justification to pursue the
matter by further investigation. This usually means going
up to the suspect and talking to him. If his suspicions are
not allayed, and if the initial stop was reasonable under the
circumstances, and if for some good reason he feels apprehensive (he suspects a crime of violence has been committed,
or that the man may be armed and dangerous), he may then
"frisk" the suspect--that is, give him a pat-down to ascertain
whether he has weapons. This is only a weapons search and not
a search for a packet of marijuana or a missing manuscript.
But if such an item is found in the course of the weapons
search, the suspect may be arrested rather than "detained,"
searched rather than "frisked," and conducted unceremoniously
to the station house.
Much case law has been made since Terry, including
a 1972 decision which allowed a police officer to interrogate
a man sitting in a car on a tip that he had heroin and a gun
under his · belt, to reach under the belt, on finding the gun
to arrest him for weapons possession, and then to search him
and the vehicle for the narcotics. This is a lot closer to
your situation, because here the officer is acting on information from another person and not on what he sees himself. It
is an indication that the court may broaden its position to
justify a limited detention and search for less than probable
cause, and for something the officer did not see but which was
told to him by. somebody else. It is doubtful that such a rule
ever will be applied generally, and in my opinion it would be
exceedingly dangerous to every citizen, including good guys
like you and me. But the case does suggest that there can be
circumstances in which a police officer can act on information furnished him by another person, in addition to that
which reaches him from his informed senses. The rule therefore could be made the basis of legislation which would allow
a peace officer to detain, and if necessary search, a person whom the informant--a reading room attendant, for example
--has actually seen attempt to steal archival, library or
museum property. The same legislation could protect that
informant if he told the truth and if what he observed in
fact amounts to probable cause.
By the way, the word "arrest" itself can be confusing. We rightly think of it as the process by which a
suspect is orally charged with a specific crime and taken to
28
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the police station. In addition, we now have two other meanings
to consider. In the "stop and frisk" context, the person is .
accosted by a police officer involuntarily for purposes of
investigation. If he is not free to walk away, this investigatory
stage is not an "arrest" in the usual lay sense of the word,
but legally it is. Even the Supreme Court calls it instead a
"momentary detention" (and words of that sort), while admitting
that it is sheer torture of the English language to pretend it
is not a "seizure" of the person, just as an arrest is. But in
the law of false arrest, the slightest touching or detaining of
a person against his will is an arrest, and if not lawful, consensual or privileged, it can be the basis of a damage suit.
I feel that you need more protection in cases where
you really have cause to believe that someone is making off
with the archival or library property. The legislation I would
propose addresses three questions: Can we broaden the area
where the detention (and if necessary the search) of such a
person is lawful? Can we broaden the area of consent? And
can we broaden the area of privilege?
Of course the situation you confront is much more
subtle than that of the detective in a high crime area who believes he recognizes an escaped felon, or who sees conduct that
suggests a suspect is casing a store preparatory to breaking
in or is selling narcotics. What probably happens is that you
the archivist suddenly realize something has disappeared and
a visitor could have taken it, or that a visitor has closed
his briefcase on what could be a valuable document or reference
book, or even that you think you saw him slip something surreptitiously under his coat. Even if you are fairly sure
there is a thief in your presence and that he has the material
in his possession, you can hardly hold him against his will,
certainly not if his possessory crime is only a misdemeanor,
which it would be if the value of the manuscript, or whatever, is less than $100. Of course you have the right politely
to question him. It is when you seek to detain him against
his will that you are in trouble. If the material has been
charged out to him, he is responsible for it. But if he denies
knowledge and refuses to open his coat or his briefcase, and
the material in fact appears to be missing, what do you do?
We need legislation to broaden the area of detention
and search. I suggest that detention and search never be attempted by a custodian of materials. Assuming that you have
a detective or security guard with police power on the premises, or can get a policeman there quickly, you must remember
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that even if you saw the suspect pocketing the material, the
policeman only has your word for that fact. Further, he only
has your word for the fact that the material is worth over
$100 and therefore is of felony proportions. Hence the policeman him.self would be doing an illegal act if he arrested without a warrant for a crime not committed in his presence,
especially if that crime might be only a misdemeanor. To
shore up his power, for your protection, I suggest a clause
found in some of the shoplifting statutes. It reads:
A peace officer may, upon a charge being made
and without a warrant, arrest any person whom he
has reasonable cause to believe has committed or
attempted to commit theft of or intentional dam.age
to Depository property.
If you have seen a theft, or seen things which,
although they are circumstantial evidence, convince you that
the visitor is committing a theft, your relation of these
facts to the officer gives him the probable cause required
by the statute. It places you more or less in the position
of an informant, and the 1973 Allen case I mentioned which
allowed a limited detention based on an informant's tip,
indicates that such legislation would be Constitutional as
a r-easonabLe search or seizure. The Supreme Court has
emphasized on several occasions that it is only the unt>easonab Le search which is prohibited. The presumption that
any search without a warrant is unreasonable is w~at needs
to be removed in the situation we are talking about.
The second piece of legislation I propose shores
up your position and gives you a qualified privilege to act
where you otherwise could not. It protects you for what you
do within its parameters, and it also protects you where you·
call a policeman and the policeman, acting on what you have
told him, makes an arrest. The purpose of such legislation
is to give you immunity from a false arrest or false im.prison~nt suit or malicious prosecution where you have probable
cause to believe that the suspect has removed the material
and is intending to steal it. The wording can be taken
substantially from the paragraph of Mr. Berkeley's Virginia
legislation headed "Exemption from liability for arrest of
suspected person" or from the Georgia Code !105-1005, which
is the Georgia shoplifting statute. The law provides, in a
a.tore situation, that if an employee reasonably thinks a
customer is shoplifting, and if the customer has behaved in
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such a manner as to cause a man of reasonable prudence to
believe that he was shoplifting, and if the time and manner
of detention or arrest of the customer are reasonable, the
customer may not recover damages against the store or the
employee for detention. This constitutes a defense to a
false arrest or malicious prosecution action and is what is
called a "qualified privilege" based on probable cause.
To illustrate, recall Groucho Marx and his prank
with the phony diamonds. Under common law rules, if he were
detained and searched and no store property found on him,
he technically would have a right of action for false arrest.
Once a mistake is made, it does not matter how much probable
cause the storekeeper had: if he is wrong, he is liable.
The "reasonable cause" legislation reverses this situation
and is illustrated nicely in the Georgia case of S. S. Kresge
Co. v. Carty [120 Ga. App. 170]. Our shoplifting law makes
it illegal not only to steal merchandise, but to steal or
alter labels. A woman and her husband walked into a K-Mart
store and spent a lot of time in the picture frame department. A clerk saw her put into her pocketbook a yellow roll
of something which looked to him like the rolls of price tags
used by the store in that department. The store had been
having trouble with people switching labels on merchandise,
so the clerk followed Mrs. Carty out to the sidewalk and
asked her whether she did not have a roll of price tags in
her pocketbook. The yellow roll turned out to be not a roll
of price tags but a yellow tape measure she· had brought along
for use in selecting a picture frame. She alleged that she
was forced to go back into the store and allow a search of
her bag, and suffered great humiliation and so on. Under
the former rule, the store would have been liable for damages.
With the shoplifting statute, the court held that "it is the
public policy of this state that there be no recovery" where
the person's behavior reasonably caused an employee to believe
the person was shoplifting. It added: "It is when the jury
may conclude that an honest mistake was made and that the
merchant had reasonable cause to believe that one was shoplifting that the defense is available."
Custodians of valuable property, such as archives
and records, need this same protection. It covers you for
what you do personally and what you cause a police officer
to do in the way of arrest or search if it finally turns
out that a mistake was made.
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Even with this protection, however, I must warn
you that stores generally caution their staffs to be very
careful in what they do or say. Rich's, as I have said,
adopts the basic slogan for its security people: "If you
didn't see it, it didn't happen." And while Rich's and some
other stores now use on all the higher priced merchandise
the electronic markers which set off an alarm if not reDX>ved,
the employees are trained never to make accusations. Instead,
they apologize to the customer, blame the presence of the
activator on the probable negligence of a sales clerk in
forgetting to remove it after making a sale, and point out
that of course the customer does not want to wear the item
with the activator on because it would set off alarms in
other stores. In this way, according to Rich's head of security, they frequently reassure the customer sufficiently
to get her to open her shopping bag or whatever. The employees
also may suggest that they be shown the sales slip in order to
reprimand the clerk, and by this means recover a considerable
amount of stolen goods by allowing the customer to save face
and pretend that the item got into the shopping bag simply by
accident. But in these instances, so far as I know, they do
not make a case against the shoplifter.
This brings me to a third possible piece of legislation. As I said, any detention, any interference with the
right of another person to come and go as he sees fit, is an
arrest. And arrests without warrants for arrest, like searches
without a valid arrest or a search warrant, are presumptively
illegal. The burden is always on the person making the arrest
or search to convince a jury that he had probable cause, that
he acted under the circumstances as a reasonable person would
be expected to do. The really blanket exception to these rules
is the search by consent. One who consents to the opening of
his briefcase or pocketbook cannot complain. This is the premise on which the airlines operate in requiring you and. your
hand luggage to go through electronic surveillance. The underlying theory is that nobody -is forcing you to go into the
protected area, but if you want to do so you must consent to
certain actions which otherwise would be an invasion of your
privacy. The reason for this curtailment of your rights lies
in public necessity. It is a protection to the public and
crews who fly on airplanes against the illegal acts of· the
hijacker, the mentally disturbed person with a bomb, and so
on. Its purpose is to promote the public welfare.
Archivists and librarians who have in their care
articles of great value are in a special situation, because
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what you are protecting is a unique and irreplaceable cultural heritage. I should like, therefore, to see archives,
museums and libraries protected by a Consent to Search law,
which would imply the consent to search clothing or personal
effects from presence in the area. The visitor must know
that he is giving up a part of his right to privacy before
he enters; the choice is then his, as it is the airline passenger's, whether or not to use the facility.
An act could state:
Any Depository may place within its entranceway a sign substantially as follows: YOUR PRES-

ENCE HERE CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO THE SEARCH OF
ALL CLOTHING AND PERSONAL EFFECTS BROUGHT ON THESE
PREMISES. The custodian or authorized agent of
a Depository displaying such notice may detain and
question any person whose conduct causes reasonable
grounds for suspicion that such person is engaging,
or is about to engage, in theft of, or criminal
damage or trespass to, Depository property. The
employee or agent also may search the clothing and
personal effects of the suspect. Visitors will be
deemed to have consented to reasonable detention
and search, and no action for false arrest, false
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution may be predicated on .such action.
Not every library or archives will want to post
such a sign because of the public relations problem it might
engender. For those used primarily by bona fide researchers
and serious visitors and students, it should be very helpful.
Even with the probable aause and reasonable man legislation,
cases may occur that must be suffered through trial and jury
verdict because of wide differences in testimony. I think
this is what makes storekeepers hesitate, even when they
are sure that the taking was a theft. Instead, they are
satisfied if they get back the merchandise, or even part
of it. Merchandise is replaceable; manuscripts are not.
I would make one final comment on the words used.
In Georgia, "theft" encompasses every taking with the intent
to deprive the owner of the property. Defacement or damage
to books is covered by the criminal damage statute (Code S261502) if the damage exceeds $100, or the criminal trespass
statute (Code §26-1503(a)) if the damage is less than $100
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or if there is willful interference with the possession or
use of the property not amounting to theft. The word "property" in the criminal code means either real or personal
property.
The three changes in the law which I am suggesting would apply whether the property involved was a broken
window, a defaced wall, a desk or typewriter, a document,
or work of art. They would apply also whether or not the
person suspected is a user or an employee. These three
areas--broadening the permissible "arrest" area for peace
officers, activating a probable cause defense, and establishing a consent to search rule where appropriate--would give
archivists, librarians, and museum curators maximum protection.
You need this protection, for you are the guardians of our
cultural heritage. And only as we have an opportunity to
know and venerate the past can we meaningfully inform the
future.

NOTE
1

James B. Rhoads, "Alienation and Thievery:
Archival Problems," American Archivist, 29 (April, 1966),

207.

[Action aimed at securing appropriate legislation to protect Georgia's archivists in defending the resources ' entrusted to them does not stop here. See ARCHIVE
NOTES, pps. 73-83, below.--Ed.]
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